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Abstract: At the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the government of Israel quickly introduced
aggressive social distancing measures to curb the virus spread and adapted its unemployment
insurance program in response to rising unemployment rates. This study examines the
relationship between household income and the experience of material hardship during the
COVID-19 pandemic in Israel, and investigates how the receipt of unemployment benefits
moderated the relationship between income and material hardship. Using data from a household
survey, we find a negative association between household income and the experience of material
hardship. Moreover, middle-income households receiving unemployment benefits were more
likely to experience material hardship than those who did not receive government support. The
difference was largely not observed for low- and high-income households. These trends were
similar during the early and later months of the pandemic. This study informs the efforts of
policymakers to improve existing social support programs to expedite economic recovery during
and after the COVID-19 pandemic.
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INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic led to the most acute economic downturn—and the most strenuous
government response to that downturn—in recent history. The skyrocketing unemployment rates
and radical shifts in consumer behaviors were accompanied by governments implementing an
array of new programs (or expansions of existing programs) to help households weather the
social and economic impacts of the pandemic. However, the extent to which households were
actually able to avoid hardships during the pandemic, and the extent to which public policies
helped buffer them against hardship risk, remains unclear. In this study, we draw on a national,
multi-wave survey administered in Israel to examine the experience of material hardships—such
as food insecurity, missed housing payments, and missed essential bill payments—over the first
year of the pandemic. We then explore how access to unemployment insurance (UI) benefits, a
key pillar in Israel’s economic stabilization efforts during the pandemic, moderated the
relationship between household income and material hardships.
The experience of material hardship can have serious, lasting impacts on the household’s
well-being. Research shows that skipped rent payments and housing insecurity are associated
with worse physical (Cutts et al., 2011) and mental health outcomes, especially among children
(Gilman et al., 2003). 1 Food insecurity has also been shown to be closely related to problems in
childhood development (Rose-Jacobs et al., 2008) and is negatively associated with health
outcomes across the life-cycle (Gundersen & Ziliak, 2015). Oftentimes, a household’s
experience of material hardship is preceded by an unexpected financial shock (e.g., sudden loss
in employment or income, a sharp increase in expenses) that makes it harder to afford necessities

Research in this section is based on work conducted outside of Israel. While the relationships between financial
shocks, hardship, and socio-economic status are expected to be relatively generalizable, the institutional and cultural
factors may influence the strength of these relationships in the context of Israel.
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like housing or food costs (Despard et al., 2018). Additional evidence demonstrates that
households who experience financial shocks are more likely to struggle financially (Pew
Charitable Trusts, 2015), miss essential bills (McKernan et al., 2009), report food insecurity
(Bartfeld & Collins, 2017; Heflin, 2016; Leete & Bania, 2010), and experience housing hardship
(Heflin, 2016).
Household have several options to reduce their hardship risk when faced with a financial
shock. They can search for other jobs or sources of income, reduce spending on non-essential
items, draw on existing financial resources such as emergency savings or other forms of
liquidity, or access public benefits like UI. Though all households can potentially rely on each of
these options, the experience of financial shocks and material hardship tends to occur
disproportionately in households who lack the resources to adequately manage those shocks.
Specifically, low-income households tend to experience relatively more expensive financial
shocks than households with higher incomes (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2015), and the prevalence
of material hardship tends to decrease monotonically for higher income quintiles (Sullivan et al.,
2008). Additional research indicates that low-income households may be less equipped to face
financial shocks and may therefore experience hardship at higher rates. Several studies have
found that liquid savings can serve as a buffer against hardship in the face of financial shocks
(Gjertson, 2016; Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2016; McKernan et al., 2009). Perhaps unsurprisingly,
certain households are less equipped than others to build the savings that can buffer against
hardship. Low-income households also tend to have their budgets dominated by necessity
spending (Collins & Gjertson, 2013), making it relatively difficult to set aside money for savings
prior to a shock or to reduce spending on non-essential items after the shock, thus making them
more vulnerable to hardship risks.

Outside of individual strategies to buffer against hardship risk in the face of financial
shocks, governments often provide an array of public programs to help households smooth their
consumption and avoid hardship. These programs can take many forms including unemployment
benefits that provide income to households during periods of unemployment and other cash
transfer programs (sometimes involving spending restrictions) that help households meet
consumption needs when other income is insufficient. Evidence consistently shows that the
receipt of social transfer programs can help households cope with financial instability and
hardship, especially among economically vulnerable groups (Hardy, 2017; Ratcliffe et al., 2011).
At the same time, access to these programs often depends on complicated eligibility criteria such
as means testing or a household’s ability to navigate the bureaucratic procedures of resourceconstrained agencies (Hamilton et al., 2015; Moynihan & Herd, 2010; Roll & Grinstein-Weiss,
2020).
Though research has documented the relationships between income, access to
government benefits, and material hardship risk, the vast majority of this work takes place in the
context of relatively stable economic conditions and focuses on household-level, rather than
system-level, economic shocks. The COVID-19 pandemic thus offers an opportunity to observe
these relationships during a time of both massive economic upheaval and assertive government
responses, and Israel—generally considered to have among the best public responses to the
pandemic—offers an interesting test case for understanding the extent to which both individual
financial circumstances and public policies can help insure against hardship risk in a population.
The specific research questions for this study are: (1) What was the relationship between prepandemic household income and the experience of material hardship during the COVID-19
pandemic in Israel? (2) To what extent did the receipt of unemployment benefits moderate the

relationship between household income and material hardship? (3) How did the relationship
between household income and material hardship, as well as the moderating role of
unemployment benefits differ during the earlier and later months of the pandemic? Using data
from a unique, three-wave online household survey administered to a sample of Israeli
households between June of 2020 and February of 2021, we find a negative association between
household income and the experience of material hardship during the COVID-19 pandemic. Our
results further suggest that government benefits may have been disproportional to household
needs, as middle-income households receiving unemployment benefits in the early and later
months of the pandemic reported greater levels of material hardship than those who did not
receive government support—a trend that, with a single exception, was not observed for lowand high-income households. Overall, these results were consistent across earlier and later
months of the pandemic.
While the experience of material hardship has been studied extensively in the context of
the U.S., the issues of hardship received much less attention in research in Israel. Unlike
relatively objective financial outcomes (e.g., income, debt, savings), the experience of hardship
captures a household’s financial situation in a more holistic way, and the instances of hardships
are well-aligned with other government policy objectives concerning affordable housing, food
security and nutrition, and health care. For these reasons, new evidence on the experience of
material hardship can inform the design and implementation of more holistic and equitable social
welfare programs—which is particularly relevant for the case of Israel, a country that has one of
highest levels of poverty and income inequality among high-income nations (National Insurance
Institute of Israel [NII], 2017; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
[OECD], 2021a; 2021b). Findings from this research will also inform the efforts of Israel and

other governments in mitigating the consequences of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and
preparing for similar outbreaks in the future. Given pre-existing high rates of poverty and the
major financial burden caused by the pandemic, research findings will help Israeli policymakers
develop more effective policy innovations and improve existing social support programs to
expedite economic recovery during and after the COVID-19 crisis.
RESEARCH CONTEXT
Israel’s Socio-Economic Background
Among developed countries, Israel has some of the highest levels of poverty and inequality: as of
2016, the incidence of poverty among families was 19%, and income inequality in Israel was
substantially higher than the OECD average (NII, 2017). A high proportion of the poor includes
working households (NII, 2017). While evidence also points to relatively high prevalence of
material hardship in Israel, research on predictors of material hardship is limited (e.g., Lewin &
Stier, 2017, 2018). For example, Lewin & Stier (2017) indicate that 17% of their sample reported
skipping a meal due to financial difficulties and 11% could not afford a daily hot meal.
Furthermore, 41% of respondents reported not being able to cool or heat their homes due to
financial strain, 25% could not fully cover their bills, and 9% had their utilities disconnected.
The experience of material hardship was disproportionately experienced across religious/ethnic
groups. Other studies indicate high levels of food insecurity among Israeli households. For
example, 19% of Israelis were found to be food insecure (9.4% severely food insecure) in 20112012 (Endeweld & Silber, 2017), and nearly one in five Israelis (18.9%) reported food insecurity
(8.6% severe food insecurity) in 2014 (Endeweld et al., 2014).
Unemployment Benefits in Israel

The Israeli government provides a wide array of social security programs to support households
across the income spectrum (see Gal, 2017). Of particular interest to this study is the provision of
unemployment benefits to the unemployed. The UI program was adopted by the parliament in
1972, becoming an integral part of the Israeli social security system and the main support to the
unemployed (Rosenhek, 2004). The original motives for designing the UI program were twofold.
First, the UI program aimed to ensure that those who have become involuntarily unemployed—
i.e., individuals who could not find employment when they were ready to work and to accept a
suitable job offered to them—had access to alternative income during the period of
unemployment. While the benefits were intended as a substitute for wage incomes, the income
replacement rate in the original UI program was higher for the unemployed with previous low
incomes and lower for the unemployed with higher previous incomes. Second, the UI program
worked as a policy tool to increase worker mobility by supporting workers during the job search
process and to help stimulate economy after economic downturns.
In the three decades since its adoption, the UI program has undergone numerous changes
that restricted the program eligibility and reduced unemployment benefits (Doron, 2001; Koreh
et al., in press), with most changes implemented due to fiscal reasons. Shortly after the UI
program implementation during the 1970s and with the growth of unemployment doing the
1980s recession, the government made several policy amendments to limit the entitlement to the
UI program—introducing the requirement to accept any job offer and thereby making it more
difficult for the unemployed to qualify for and receive unemployment benefits. The amendments
also resulted in more rigid administrative practices in paying out unemployment benefits, which
in many cases led to increased rates of denying access to the benefits (Doron, 2001). Additional
changes through the 1990s aimed to further tighten the eligibility criteria, reduce the level of

unemployment benefits, and shorten the duration of receiving the benefits. For example,
unemployed workers under the age of 35 were required to accept any job even if it did not fit
their occupation or the level of educational training, and UI recipients had to take a job even if
the wages were lower than the unemployment benefit payments to which they were entitled. In
addition, the effective replacement rate of the benefit levels for middle- and high-income
recipients has been lowered. The amendment of 2007 continued to restrict access to benefits,
particularly for younger workers, lengthening the qualification period and requiring individuals
under the age of 28 to accept any job offered; shortening the entitlement period for individuals
under 25; and reducing the generosity of unemployment benefits for individuals under the age of
28 (Koreh et al., in press).
As a result of gradual reductions in eligibility and benefit amounts, the Israeli UI program
was among the less generous among the high-income countries. Prior to the COVID-19
outbreak, the UI program accounted for just four percent of all national insurance benefit
spending (NII, 2018), and the Israeli government spending on social insurance policies was
lower than the OECD average (Bendalak, 2020).
The COVID-19 Pandemic in Israel
As the COVID-19 pandemic was spreading around the globe, the government of Israel was quick
to react by closing its borders and introducing aggressive social distancing measures in March of
2020, and enforcing a complete lockdown in April of 2020 to curb the virus spread. New
requirements to limit the number of workers present at the workplace (to 10 workers or 30% of
the personnel, whichever was greater) resulted in a permanent or temporary dismissal of
employees (Albin & Mundlak, 2020). Employers in the private sector—and to a lesser degree
those in the public sector—were allowed to force their employees to take unpaid leave: as of

May, out of more than 800,000 who were furloughed in the middle of March, only about 70,000
employees returned to the labor force.
More generally, within a short time period, unemployment and furlough rates surged
from a record low in February of 2020 to a record high by April 2020 (Central Bureau of
Statistics [CBS], 2020a). The combined rate of unemployment and furlough due to COVID-19
was 3.4% in the beginning of February, spiking to 36.7% in the beginning of April and dropping
to 10.5% in the beginning of June, as seen in Figure 1. Consistent with increased unemployment
rates, the number of recipients of UI skyrocketed from a monthly average of 77,700 in February
of 2020 to 894,550 in May of 2020 (NII, 2020). As of the end of June, about 675,000 workers
received unemployment benefits, approximately 100,000 individuals received income support
benefits, and approximately 75,000 were rejected due to non-compliance with eligibility terms
and conditions (Ilan, 2020a). Unemployment and furlough rates remained consistently high after
June, before spiking again in the end of September 2020 (17.1%) and the beginning of October
2020 (20.7%) and in the month of January 2021 (over 14%) (Figure 1). Both of these surges in
unemployment and furlough rates roughly coincided with the second and third national
lockdowns imposed by the Israeli government in in September and January. The high rates of
unemployment also meant that a non-negligible share of the population were eligible for and
received UI benefits.
To help families cope with the effects of job loss and mitigate the risks of hardship during
the COVID-19 pandemic, the Israeli government had to come up with additional budgets to fund
its social insurance programs and offer Israeli households additional financial supports. The
government assistance package was designed to ensure income support for households of
salaried employees, small businesses, and the self-employed persons who have lost their main

source of income. The specific financial assistance included, for example, expanded
unemployment benefits, income supplements for the lowest-income households, grants and
discounted loans for businesses and self-employed workers, and stimulus payments in April and
August of 2020. Israeli households could also qualify for additional benefits like the
postponement of foreclosure actions, flexibility on bill payments, deferrals on loan payments,
deferrals on taxes, and facilitated access to credit (Gal and Madhala, 2020).
Notably, in response to rising unemployment rates, the Israeli government adapted its
guidelines of the UI program, for example, extending the timeline for receiving unemployment
benefits, 2 shortening the qualification period for receiving unemployment benefits, extending the
period for receiving a combination of unemployment benefits and other means-tested programs,
and extending unemployment support to elderly workers and some groups of self-employed
workers and freelancers. These COVID-19-related modifications to the UI program were
expected to slow down an increase in poverty rates (Andelblad et al., 2020). As of June 2020, the
total assistance package totaled approximately 7.2% of the country’s gross domestic product
(Ministry of Finance, 2020). Notably, all COVID-19 eligibility and benefit extensions in the UI
program are set to expire on June 30, 2021.
Study Hypotheses
Our study examines the extent to which Israeli households’ pre-pandemic incomes and access to
UI in Israel predict the experience of material hardships over the course of the COVID-19
pandemic. We develop several study hypotheses about the relationship between household
income, experience of material hardship, and the receipt of unemployment benefits during the

As of November of 2020, approximately a quarter of a million of workers were considered long-term unemployed
(i.e., they were unemployed before the pandemic) (Ilan, 2020b). Extensions of the timeline to receive unemployment
benefits allowed these individuals to qualify for unemployment benefits beyond the standard period of eligibility.
2

COVID-19 pandemic. First, we expect a negative relationship between pre-pandemic household
income and household hardship, with low-income households expected to be at a greater risk of
facing different types of material hardships. Second, while households with lower incomes and
worse financial conditions may be likely to experience material hardship, we hypothesize that the
receipt of government benefits can help households across the income spectrum mitigate the
experience of hardship. Third, given the severity of the pandemic and the aggressive public
health and economic response of the Israeli government to the viral spread during the early
months of the pandemic, we anticipate that the each of these relationships will be stronger during
the early months of the pandemic and less pronounced in the later months of the COVID-19
outbreak.
METHODS
Data and Sample
Data for this paper come from a multi-wave online survey fielded by Washington University in
St. Louis to a national sample of Israeli respondents in three-month intervals during the COVID19 pandemic. The first wave of the survey was fielded between June 4 and July 1, 2020 (with a
median respondent completing the survey on June 11), the second wave was fielded between
September 13 and October 21, 2020 (with a median survey completion date of September 22),
and the third wave was administered between December 29, 2020 and February 7, 2021 (with a
median respondent finishing the survey on January 11). As seen in Figure 1, the first wave of the
household survey was fielded shortly after Israel saw the lowest rate of new COVID-19 cases
and immediately before the rate of new cases started to increase considerably in July. The second
and third waves of the survey coincided with two spikes in COVID-19 cases and two lockdowns
imposed by the government in mid-September and end-December of 2020.

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The survey was administered to the online survey panel of Israeli adults (aged 18 and
over) by a local research firm. We applied four demographic quotas (gender, age, income, and
religiosity) to sample Jewish respondents to ensure that our sample resembled the Jewish adult
population. Since the differences in internet use among Arab Israelis (e.g., by age) make it
difficult to apply pre-determined quotas to an online sample of Arab Israelis, no sampling criteria
were applied for Arab Israeli respondents. The survey collected detailed information on
household demographic characteristics, employment situation, debt holding, asset ownership,
experience of hardships, health status, the receipt of government benefits, exposure to COVID19, and perspectives on the pandemic.
The survey collected data on approximately 2,300 respondents in each wave and each
wave consisted of cross-sectional and panel components. We used data from the first wave of the
survey to study household experiences of material hardship during the early months of the
pandemic. In Wave 1 of the survey, of 18,843 respondents who were invited to participate in the
survey, 3,084 agreed to participate (a 16.4% response rate), and 2,635 accessed the online survey
link. After dropping non-consenting and non-completing respondents, as well as respondents
under the age of 18, the sample was reduced to 2,301 respondents. Following the listwise
deletion of missing data on key demographic and financial characteristics, our final analytical
sample for analyses that incorporated only the first survey wave included 1,889 observations.
Further, we relied on data from the second and third waves of the survey to examine the
trends in household hardship during the later period of the pandemic. In Waves 2 and 3, we
prioritized sampling panel respondents who appeared in the first survey wave, which resulted in
a high response rates across the waves (78.6% of individuals who participated in Wave 1 of the

survey also completed Wave 2, and 65.4% completed all three survey waves). For the analysis
that focused on the second and third waves of the survey, we used pooled cross-sectional data,
which included 3,835 observations (1,885 in Wave 2 and 1,950 in Wave 3) after the listwise
deletion of missing data.
Measures
Dependent Variables
We used three survey questions to measure material hardship experienced by survey respondents
during the COVID-19 pandemic. These measures of hardships reflect (i) the difficulty of making
housing payments, (ii) the incidence of skipping bills or paying bills late, and (iii) the inability to
afford adequate food. The survey question on housing hardship asked respondents whether
within the past three months of taking the survey, their household did not pay the full amount of
the rent or mortgage because they could not afford it. The question on bill paying hardship asked
survey participants whether within the past three months of the survey, their household skipped
paying a bill or paid a bill late due to not having enough money. The measure of food insecurity
was based on a survey question that asked whether in the past three months of the survey,
respondents’ household could not afford the type or amount of food needed. The three material
hardship measures were similar to those used in other surveys and studies (Danziger et al., 2000;
Despard et al., 2018; Heflin et al., 2009; Rector et al., 1999; Urban Institute, 2018). Each
outcome variable was represented by a dichotomous variable where the variable took a value of
one if a household experienced hardship, and zero otherwise. Survey questions inquiring about
household hardship were identical across the survey waves.
Independent, Moderating, and Control Variables

The independent variable of interest is household income. Household income corresponds to
self-reported household gross monthly income before COVID-19. In each wave of the survey,
the survey question read as follows: “Before the COVID-19 pandemic, what was the total pre-tax
monthly income your household received from all sources, such as wages, government benefits,
pensions, or side jobs?” We classified households into three groups based on their pre-pandemic
income. We define low-income households as those with average household gross monthly
incomes of NIS 8,000 or less (USD 2,279 or less), middle-income households as those with
incomes between NIS 8,001 and NIS 17,000 (USD 2,279 and USD 4,843), and high-income
households as those with incomes of NIS 17,001 and above (USD 4,844 and above). 3 Selected
income thresholds roughly correspond to the second and fifth deciles of the household gross
monthly income based on 2018 data from Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics.
A moderating variable identifies a household’s receipt of unemployment benefits within
three months of the survey. To obtain the measure of a household’s receipt of unemployment
benefits, we first asked respondents whether they or anyone in your household was receiving
unemployment benefits. Those who responded that their households were not currently receiving
unemployment benefits, were further inquired whether their households received unemployment
benefits in the past three months. The survey questions were identical across the survey waves.
The variable was measured as a dichotomous variable, where households receiving
unemployment benefits within the past three months were coded as one and households that did
not receive unemployment benefits were coded as zero.
Remaining control variables include an array of demographic and financial
characteristics, such a as respondent’s gender, age, age squared, religion/ethnicity, marital status,
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Exchange rates correspond to June 1, 2020.

highest educational attainment, housing status, current employment status, district of residence,
the number of adults and children in a household, household’s receipt of income support or
income supplement, 4 and the amount of a one-time COVID-19 (in NIS 1,000) relief payment
households received during the pandemic. This one-time COVID-19 payment includes a
stimulus payment delivered to qualifying families in April of 2020 (in the first wave) or in
August of 2020 (in the second and third waves). 5 Finally, regressions that used data for Waves 2
and 3 of the survey also controlled for survey wave.
Empirical Method
The analysis proceeds in two stages. To examine the relationship between pre-pandemic
household income and material hardship during the pandemic, we conducted a logistic regression
analysis, where dependent variables correspond to the experience of housing hardship, bill
paying hardship, and food insecurity. We estimated the following regression model for each
outcome:
𝑃𝑃

𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 (𝑃𝑃) = log �1−𝑃𝑃� = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊 𝛽𝛽2 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

(1)

where 𝑃𝑃 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ). Here, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 describes whether household i experienced each material
hardship within past three months of the survey, 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 represents household gross monthly income

before COVID-19, and 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊 includes a vector of demographic and financial characteristics
described above. To differentiate between the early and later periods of the COVID-19

pandemic, we estimated Equation 1 separately using data only from Wave 1 of the survey (to
focus on the early months of the pandemic) and using a combined sample of respondents who
The income support or supplement is a means-tested government benefit provided to the low-income households.
In April of 2020, the amount of a one-time payment was relatively small, as each household received NIS 500
(USD 148) per child, and small payments were provided to old-age pension recipients, income support beneficiaries,
and people with disabilities. In August of 2020, the Israeli government provided a nearly universal grant (which
excluded high-income earners) in the amount of NIS 750 to each adult over the age of 18. Couples with children
received additional funds per child, and those eligible for certain government benefits also received higher benefits.
4
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completed Waves 2 or 3 of the survey (to focus on the later months of the pandemic). Models
that relied on data from the second and third survey waves were treated as pooled cross-sections,
even though they included a large number of panel respondents. For these analyses, we clustered
standard errors by individuals to account for the fact that a given individual could take the survey
multiple times at different waves.
Next, to examine the extent to which the receipt of unemployment benefits moderated the
relationship between household income and material hardship, we estimated additional logistic
regression models. The experience of each type of material hardship was regressed on the
interaction between the average household income before COVID-19 and the receipt of
unemployment benefits during the first three months of the COVID-19 pandemic, as follows:
𝑃𝑃

𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 (𝑃𝑃) = log �1−𝑃𝑃� = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼4 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊 𝛼𝛼4 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

(2)

where 𝑌𝑌, 𝐼𝐼, and 𝑿𝑿 are described as above, 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 reflects household’s receipt of unemployment

benefits in the past three months, and 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 corresponds to the interaction of household income

and the receipt of unemployment benefits. The inclusion of the interaction term allows us to

investigate the degree to which the association between household income and material hardship
was moderated by the receipt of unemployment benefits. Similar to the analysis above, we
distinguished between the early and later months of the pandemic by estimating Equation 2 on a
sample of respondents who participated only in the first survey wave, as well as those who
completed the second or third waves of the survey. When estimating regression models for
Waves 2 and 3, we again clustered standard errors by individuals.
For ease of interpretation, we report average marginal effects or predicted probabilities of
the dependent variable based on the logistic regression estimates.
Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 presents descriptive characteristics for our analytical sample. The average respondent
was roughly 43 years old. The majority of respondents (56%) were women. A vast majority of
survey takers—nearly three-fourths—were Jewish (excluding Ultra-Orthodox Jews), 6 8% were
Ultra-Orthodox Jews, 15.5% were Arab Israelis, and the remaining 3% were other
religion/ethnicity. Over two-thirds of respondents were married or lived with a partner, and
nearly half of the sample had at least one child in the household. Most households had two adults
living in a household. Sixty-nine percent of respondents earned at least a post-secondary degree
(e.g., teaching or engineering certificate) or a Bachelor’s degree. Over 60% of respondents
owned their homes—either with or without a mortgage—nearly a quarter were renters, and the
remaining 13% neither rented nor owned their homes. As of June 2020, 50.5% of respondents
were employed or self-employed full-time, 17% worked part-time, 13% were unemployed or
furloughed, and 19% had other employment status (e.g., retired). Nearly a quarter of respondents
came from low-income households (pre-pandemic monthly household incomes of less than NIS
8,000), 44% were from middle-income households (pre-pandemic monthly household incomes
between NIS 8,001 and NIS 17,000), and 32% from high-income households (monthly
household incomes over NIS 17,000). The most commonly received government benefit in the
three months prior to the survey was one-time COVID-19 relief payments (49.4% of
households). In the three months prior to the survey, 35% of households also received
unemployment benefits and 9% received an income support or supplement. When considering
the receipt of unemployment benefits over time, Figure 2 further shows that the proportion of
households receiving unemployment benefits was highest at the time of the first survey wave
(34.5%) and dropped to 31.0% in Wave 2 and 29.7% in Wave 3.

6

This group includes Secular, Traditional, and Religious Jews.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Lastly, with respect to material hardship at the time of Wave 1, 10% of households
reported experiencing housing hardship, 18% of households said they experienced bill payment
hardship, and 22.5% reported experiencing food insecurity in the three months prior to the
survey. Figure 3 further illustrates the changes in the experience of hardship within the past three
months. The self-reported housing hardship was highest in Wave 1 (10.1%), dropping in Waves
2 and 3 (7.5% and 6.6%, respectively). The incidence of bill paying hardship was similar in
Waves 1 and 2 (18.0% and 17.7%, respectively) and reduced to 13.8% in the third wave of the
survey. Similarly, the proportion of households reporting food insecurity was similar in Waves 1
and 2 (22.5% and 21.9%, respectively), decreasing to 17.6% in Wave 3.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
RESULTS
Key Demographic and Financial Predictors of Material Hardship
Table 2 presents findings from a logistic regression model showing the relationship between key
demographic and financial characteristics and the experience of material hardship during
COVID-19 pandemic. Each model reports average marginal effects from logistic regression
models, based on Equation 1, and corresponds to different types of material hardship reported
within the past three months—housing hardship (Models 1 and 4), bill paying hardship (Models
2 and 5), and food insecurity (Models 3 and 6). Models 1-3 focus on the early period of the
pandemic and include data from Wave 1, while Models 4-6 capture later months of the pandemic
and include data from Waves 2 and 3. We use a threshold of 0.05 to identify statistical
significance of regression results.

Findings from the logistic regression analysis indicate that the experience of hardship was
significantly and negatively associated with household income after accounting for key
demographic and financial factors. The negative association holds both for the early and later
periods of the pandemic. During the early months of the pandemic (Models 1-3), compared to
low-income households, middle-income households, on average, reported lower incidence of
housing hardship (by 4.3 percentage points, p<0.05), bill paying hardship (by 6.3 percentage
points, p<0.01) and food insecurity (by 7.7 percentage points, p<0.01). The differences were
more substantial when considering high-income households. High-income households reported
lower rates of housing hardship (by 8.0 percentage points, p<0.001), bill paying hardship (by
14.1 percentage points, p<0.001), and food insecurity (by 18.6 percentage points, p<0.001)
relative to low-income households. The magnitude of coefficients remained similar during the
later months of the pandemic (Models 4-6), with the exception of bill paying hardship. The
experience of bill paying hardship was statistically similar for low- and middle-income
households, while higher income households were less likely to experience this type of material
hardship, all else equal.
The association between the receipt of unemployment benefits and material hardship
varied depending on the period of the pandemic. After accounting for a wide array of
demographic and financial covariates, we find that during the early period of the pandemic,
households who received unemployment benefits were more likely to experience housing
hardship (by 2.8 percentage points, p<0.05) and food insecurity (by 4.5 percentage points,
p<0.05) relative to households who did not receive unemployment benefits (Models 1-3). These
trends were further observed during the later period of the pandemic: households who benefited
from UI were more likely to experience housing hardship (by 2.7 percentage points, p<0.01), bill

paying hardship (by 4.3 percentage points, p<0.01), and food insecurity (by 4.2 percentage
points, p<0.01) (Models 4-6).
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
In Models 1-6, we also find a consistently positive association between the receipt of
income supplement or income support and material hardship; results suggest a positive
correlation between the amount of a one-time stimulus payment and bill paying hardship during
the early months of the pandemic. On average, renters, as well as families who owned their
homes with mortgages, faced a greater probability of hardship relative to homeowners without a
mortgage. While no statistically significant differences in the incidence of material hardship
were detected among Ultra-Orthodox Jewish households relative to non-Ultra-Orthodox Jewish
households, Arab Israelis tended to report a greater prevalence of material hardship even after
accounting for household income. Families with three or more children experienced higher rates
of material hardship (with an exception of food insecurity in the later period of the pandemic),
while households in which respondents had higher levels of education reported a lower
likelihood of experiencing material hardship.
In a set of supplemental analyses, we also examined the relationship between the receipt
of unemployment benefits and key demographic and financial household characteristics. By far
the strongest predictor of a household’s receipt of unemployment benefits during both early and
later months of the pandemic was a respondent’s job loss or furlough. 7 In addition, descriptive
analysis from Wave 1 reveals that 74.8% of households in which a respondent faced a temporary
or permanent loss of employment within three months of the survey also reported receiving

Results from these analyses are available upon request. Notably, relative to low-income households, middleincome households were more likely to receive unemployment benefits, while the difference between low- and highincome households was not statistically significant.
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unemployment benefits during the same period. Similarly, in households where a respondent’s
employment situation had changed since the start of COVID-19 pandemic, 64.3% received
unemployment benefits in Wave 2 and 65.1% received unemployment benefits in Wave 3. These
findings illustrate a high level of correlation between the receipt of household benefits and a
respondent’s loss of employment during the period of observation, suggesting that a household’s
receipt of unemployment benefits is a relatively good proxy for the experience of an employment
shock.
Moderating Relationship of Unemployment Benefits
Findings from the previous analysis show that households with higher households with prepandemic incomes were less likely to report material hardship during the pandemic. To examine
the degree to which the receipt of unemployment benefits moderated the relationship between
household income and material hardship, Tables 3 and 4 and Figures 4-9 show the results from
logistic regression models that include an interaction between unemployment receipt and
household income, based on Equation 2. We report findings for both the early months of the
pandemic (Table 3 and Figures 4-6) and the later months of the pandemic (Table 4 and Figures
7-9). Each figure displays predicted probabilities of each type of hardship for different levels of
income and benefit receipt, reporting 95% confidence intervals. We highlight four key findings
from our analysis.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
First, for each type of household hardship, we observe relatively similar trends in the
relationship between household hardship, income, and unemployment benefits between the early
and later months of the COVID-19 pandemic. While we describe the findings in more detail

below, the overall similarity in observed trends indicates that, with a few exceptions, the
association between the key variables of interest remained relatively consistent throughout the
pandemic.
Second, our findings suggest that for each type of hardship, households with the lowest
incomes who received unemployment benefits reported comparable levels of hardship as those
not receiving this government support. We also find that that low-income households receiving
unemployment benefits experienced, on average, similar levels of material hardship as those in
the middle-income group who received government support. This pattern holds for material
hardship during the early and later months of the pandemic, even after adjusting for the
experience of unemployment shock. The only exception is the experience of food insecurity in
Waves 2 and 3, as low-income households receiving unemployment benefits were more likely to
experience food insecurity than middle-income households with unemployment benefits (by 8.2
percentage points, p<0.05, Figure 9). While the exact reasons for these results are unclear, these
results potentially speak to the importance of unemployment benefits in alleviating hardship and
moderating the relationship between household income and hardship for low-income households.
That is, one interpretation for these findings could be that unemployment benefits have shielded
low-income households from additional adversity during the pandemic and helped cover their
housing and food expenses. An alternative explanation could be that low-income households
may be more resilient to various employment and income shocks, while income and
unemployment volatility may have been relatively more severe for middle-income households, in
relative terms.
[FIGURES 4-6 ABOUT HERE]

Second, we find that in general, middle-income households with unemployment benefits,
on average, fared worse than those without unemployment benefits. In particular, compared to
middle-income households who did not receive unemployment benefits, those who received
government support tended to report higher levels of housing hardship (by 5.4 percentage points
in Wave 1, p<0.01 (Figure 4), and by 4.8 percentage points in Waves 2 and 3, p<0.001 (Figure
7), bill paying hardship (by 8.9 percentage points in Wave 1, p<0.001 (Figure 5) and 6.4
percentage points in Waves 2 and 3, p<0.1 (Figure 8), and food insecurity (by 10.7 percentage
points in Wave 1, p<0.001 (Figure 6). The only statistically insignificant result among middleincome households is observed for food insecurity in Waves 2 and 3. The overall pattern of
statistically significant differences between those receiving and not receiving unemployment
benefits may potentially indicate a disconnect between the financial needs of middle-income
households during the COVID-19 pandemic and the amount of unemployment benefits these
households received.
Third, we find no statistically significant differences in material hardship between
recipients and non-recipients of unemployment benefits among high-income households. At the
same time, middle-income households who obtained government support, on average, reported
consistently greater hardship than high-income households receiving unemployment benefits.
This was true for all types of material hardship, after accounting for the experience of
unemployment shock, and the pattern held for both early and later periods during the COVID-19
pandemic. While the results may signify greater hardship in the middle-income group, these
trends may also point to differences in households’ ability to cope with financial shocks: as
higher-income households may have a greater financial cushion to weather the crisis, the amount

of unemployment benefits received by the middle-income group may be insufficient to protect
these households from hardships during the pandemic.
[FIGURES 7-9 ABOUT HERE]
Taken together, our findings suggest that certain households did not receive
unemployment benefits that were proportional to their needs. While low-income households may
have received an appropriate amount relative to their income, and high-income households may
have had enough of a financial cushion to offset the negative impacts of the crisis (in conjunction
with some government support), unemployment benefits to middle-income households may have
been relatively insufficient to offset pandemic-related risks. Indeed, additional exploration of
these data showed that while there were no statistically significant differences in the likelihood to
receive unemployment benefits by income groups, the amount of received unemployment
benefits was relatively higher in low-income families. In particular, at the time of the survey in
Wave 1, a median low-income household reported receiving NIS 3,000, a median middle-income
household was receiving NIS 3,700, and a median high-income household reported NIS 5,000 in
unemployment payments. Similarly, median amounts of unemployment benefits in Waves 2 and
3 were NIS 3,000, NIS 3,900, and 4,900 for low-, middle-, and high-income households,
respectively. 8
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Alongside the effect of COVID-19 on the health of individuals across the globe, its impact on
economies and labor markets has been dramatic, and the consequential effect on the livelihoods
and standards of living of citizens has been devastating. Even in developed economies, the
pandemic not only detrimentally affected people’s physical and mental health and caused
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Results from these analyses are available upon request.

widespread mortality but, as seen from the findings of this study, it caused hardships for
households by undermining their capacity to ensure adequate access to food and housing. In
addition to efforts to ensure public health and the medical needs of citizens, social welfare
systems have been a major tool employed to mitigate the economic and social consequences of
COVID-19. In more economically well-off, industrialized nations, policy-makers drew upon
existing social security programs—particularly UI programs—expanded them and adopted new
programs, to an extent unprecedented since the establishment of welfare states (International
Labor Organization, 2020a; 2020b; International Monetary Fund, 2020).
This article draws upon a household survey of Israeli households to explore the efforts by
the Israeli government to address the negative consequences of COVID-19 on its citizens. While
prior to the crisis, the Israeli UI program was particularly stringent and offered sufficient support
to only a small proportion of the unemployed, with the onset of the pandemic, UI was adopted as
the prime policy tool to deal with the impact of the pandemic. Indeed, UI served as a means to
buffer the sudden loss of income that affected a quarter of the Israeli workforce in the initial
months after the outbreak of COVID-19. The elevenfold increase in the number of UI benefit
recipients reflected the dramatic growth in unemployment but also policy decisions, critically the
significant expansion of the scope of eligibility for this benefit to include furloughed employees
and additional changes, intended to boost the effectiveness of this program.
The two research questions in this study related to the relationship between household
income and the experience of material hardship during the first three months of the COVID-19
pandemic in Israel, and the extent to which receipt of unemployment benefits moderated the
relationship between income and material hardship. The findings from the study underscore the
severe material hardship, as reflected in an inability to ensure access to adequate food and to pay

rents or mortgage and other bills, suffered by Israeli households due to the unemployment caused
by the pandemic. Not surprisingly, the hardship was greatest for households with the lowest
incomes and those who suffered from loss of income due to unemployment. The rapid expansion
of access to UI (alongside additional one-off steps to provide financial assistance to households)
aimed to mitigate the income loss caused by unemployment and enable Israeli families to
weather the crisis. While unemployment benefits were provided to households across the income
spectrum, the findings revealed that low-income households who received unemployment
benefits seemed to fare better—in relative terms—than middle-income households receiving this
government support. As such, at least for low- and middle-income recipients, this reflects the
progressive logic of the benefit, which is also evidenced by the program structure (NII, 2021).
The study reveals meaningful differences in the resilience that UI afforded households.
These would appear to reflect both the financial capacities of the households and the structuring
of the UI program. Though UI is intended to serve a wage-replacement function and offers
benefits that reflect, to a degree, the previous income of an employee, the Israeli program offers
a higher replacement rate to the unemployed with lower incomes. UI benefits seem to have been
particularly effective in shielding low-income households from additional adversity during the
pandemic and helping to cover their housing and food expenses. However, individuals with
middle and high incomes prior to the pandemic suffered a proportionally greater cut in their
income. Our findings indicate that though this may not have increased levels of hardship in
households with higher incomes, it did so in the case of middle-income households—as reflected
in the fact that middle-income households receiving unemployment benefits in the early months
of the pandemic reported greater levels of material hardship than those who did not receive this
government support. While high-income households may have had a sufficient financial cushion

to offset the negative impacts of the crisis, the combination of unemployment benefits and
accumulated savings may have been relatively insufficient to offset pandemic-related risks in
middle-income households.
Given expectations that the consequences of unemployment during the COVID-19
pandemic may persist in the foreseeable future, more action might be needed to provide
households with an appropriate buffer to ensure that they do not fall further behind after the
pandemic. This may require the Israeli government to maintain the improved access and
coverage of the UI program beyond the current crisis, as well as increase the relative generosity
of the UI program for middle-income households, without lowering the level of other
government supports and without reducing the amount of unemployment benefits available to
low-income households. The lack of timely and equitable government response may have longlasting, negative consequences for the economic and social well-being of many households for
years to come.
While this analysis provides importance evidence on the experience of hardship during
the COVID-19 pandemic in Israel, our study has several limitations. The current study focuses
on the experience of hardship during the early months of the pandemic characterized by a strict
lockdown and a sharp increase in the number of unemployed and furloughed workers, as well as
the later months of the pandemic, which saw additional government lockdowns and spikes in
unemployment. Findings from this work cannot be generalized to the most recent months of the
pandemic or the post-pandemic period. Furthermore, while our findings describe the overall
experience of material hardship, our work does not examine whether the differences in the rates
of hardship across income groups reflect pre-existing disparities, if they emerged during the
COVID-19 pandemic, or if the pandemic exacerbated pre-existing differences. The

generalizability of our findings may also be limited for the Arab Israeli population: while we
applied several quotas to sample Jewish respondents to ensure that the sample resembled the
Jewish adult population, no sampling criteria were applied for Arab respondents. Lastly, while
our findings report the association between household income, government support, and
household hardship, further analysis is needed to rigorously assess the causal effects of
government support on material hardship.
We expect that the findings of this study will have relevance beyond the specific case of
Israel. The COVID-19 pandemic has tested the government capacity to address the impact of a
sudden and widespread health and economic crisis on its citizens. With differing degrees of
success, social welfare programs have been mobilized to an extraordinary extent to deal with the
hardships caused by this crisis, and the UI programs have been central to this effort across the
globe. This study helps enhance our understanding as to how effective UI may be in addressing
the impact of such a crisis. The findings will contribute to efforts of policymakers to ensure that
the lessons taken from this crisis will help structure UI programs so that they are effective in
dealing with future crises and changes in labor markets.

REFERENCES
Albin, E., & Mundlak, G. (2020). COVID-19 and Labour Law: Israel. Italian Labour Law EJournal Special Issue 1, 13(1S). https://doi.org/10.6092/issn.1561-8048/10794
Andelblad, M., Heller, O., Karadi, L., & Gottlieb, D. (2020). The effect of Covid-19 crisis on
poverty, inequality and standard of Living. National Insurance Institute (In Hebrew).
Retrieved from: https://www.btl.gov.il/Publications/corona/Pages/mitun.aspx.
Bartfeld, J., & Collins, J. M. (2017). Food Insecurity, Financial Shocks, and Financial Coping
Strategies among Households with Elementary School Children in Wisconsin. Journal of
Consumer Affairs, 51(3), 519–548. https://doi.org/10.1111/joca.12162
Bendalak, J. (2020). Using unemployment insurance systems as a respond to coronavirus crisis.
National Insurance Institute World Social Security Newsletter No. 19. (In Hebrew).
https://www.btl.gov.il/Publications/corona/Pages/yedion0720.aspx
Collins, J. M., & Gjertson, L. (2013). Emergency savings for low-income consumers. Focus,
30(1), 12–17.
Cutts, D. B., Meyers, A. F., Black, M. M., Casey, P. H., Chilton, M., Cook, J. T., Geppert, J., De
Cuba, S. E., Heeren, T., Coleman, S., Rose-Jacobs, R., & Frank, D. A. (2011). US
housing insecurity and the health of very young children. American Journal of Public
Health, 101(8), 1508–1514. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2011.300139
Danziger, S., Corcoran, M., Danziger, S., & Heflin, C. (2000). Work, Income, and Material
Hardship after Welfare Reform. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 34(1), 6–30.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6606.2000.tb00081.x
Despard, M. R., Guo, S., Grinstein-Weiss, M., Russell, B., Oliphant, J. E., & Deruyter, A.
(2018). The mediating role of assets in explaining hardship risk among households

experiencing financial shocks. Social Work Research, 42(3), 147–158.
https://doi.org/10.1093/swr/svy012
Doron, A. (2001). Social welfare policy in Israel: Developments in the 1980s and 1990s. Israel
Affairs, 7(4), 153–180. https://doi.org/10.1080/13537120108719619
Endeweld M, Barkali N, Abrahamov V, Gealia A, & Gottlieb D. (2014). Food security survey
main socio-economic findings. National Insurance Institute. Research Report #115. (In
Hebrew). Retrieved from:
https://www.btl.gov.il/Publications/research/Pages/mechkar_115.aspx
Endeweld, M., & Silber, J. (2017). Food Security in Israel. In Z.-Y. Zhou & G. Wan (Eds.), Food
Insecurity in Asia: Why Institutions Matter (pp. 192–256). Asian Development Bank
Institute.
Gal, J. (2017). The Israeli welfare state system: With special reference to social inclusion. In C.
Aspalter (Ed.), The Routledge International Handbook to Welfare State Systems.
Gal, J., & Madhala, S. (2020). The Social Welfare System and the Coronavitrus Crisis. An
Overview. In A. Weiss (Ed), State of the Nation Report: Society, Economy and Policy in
Israel 2020 (pp. 299-328). Taub Center.
Gilman, S. E., Kawachi, I., Fitzmaurice, G. M., & Buka, S. L. (2003). Socio-economic status,
family disruption and residential stability in childhood: Relation to onset, recurrence and
remission of major depression. Psychological Medicine, 33(8), 1341–1355.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291703008377
Gjertson, L. (2016). Emergency saving and household hardship. Journal of Family and
Economic Issues, 37(1), 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10834-014-9434-z

Grinstein-Weiss, M., Despard, M. R., Guo, S., Russell, B., Key, C., & Raghavan, R. (2016). Do
tax-time savings deposits reduce hardship among low-income filers? A propensity score
analysis. Journal of the Society for Social Work and Research, 7(4), 707–728.
https://doi.org/10.1086/689357
Gundersen, C., & Ziliak, J. P. (2015). Food Insecurity And Health Outcomes. Health Affairs,
34(11), 1830–1839. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2015.0645
Hamilton, L., Alexander-Eitzman, B., & Royal, W. (2015). Shelter From the Storm. SAGE Open.
https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244015572487
Hardy, B. L. (2017). Income instability and the response of the safety net. Contemporary
Economic Policy, 35(2), 312–330. https://doi.org/10.1111/coep.12187
Heflin, C. (2016). Family Instability and Material Hardship: Results from the 2008 Survey of
Income and Program Participation. Journal of Family and Economic Issues, 37(3), 359–
372. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10834-016-9503-6
Heflin, C., Sandberg, J., & Rafail, P. (2009). The Structure of Material Hardship in U.S.
Households: An Examination of the Coherence behind Common Measures of WellBeing. Social Problems, 56(4), 746–764. https://doi.org/10.1525/sp.2009.56.4.746
Ilan, S. (2020a). Social Security data show: Unemployment rate - over 20%. Calcatist. (In
Hebrew). Retrieved from: https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L3836851,00.html.
Ilan, S. (2020b). The transparent Unemployed: The group that did not count during COVID-19.
Calcalist (In Hebrew). Retrieved from: https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L3871131,00.html.

International Labor Organization (2020b). Social Protection Responses to the COVID-19 Crisis
around the World. Retrieved from: https://www.socialprotection.org/gimi/RessourcePDF.action?id=56047.
International Labor Organization. (2020a). Unemployment protection in the COVID-19 crisis:
Country responses and policy considerations. Retrieved from:
https://www.ilo.org/secsoc/information-resources/publications-andtools/Brochures/WCMS_754741/lang--en/index.htm.
International Monetary Fund. (2020). Policy Responses to COVD-19. Retrieved
from: https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-1.
Koreh, M. Wolf, R., & Cohen, O. (in press). Fiscal Constriction in Social Insurance Programs
and its implications for the legislation of entitlement–Unemployment insurance as a test
case. Social Security. (In Hebrew).
Leete, L., & Bania, N. (2010). The effect of income shocks on food insufficiency. Review of
Economics of the Household, 8(4), 505–526. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11150-009-9075-4
Lewin, A. C., & Stier, H. (2017). The Experience of Material and Emotional Hardship in Israel:
Do Some Groups Cope Better than Others? Social Indicators Research, 134(1), 385–402.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-016-1412-4
Lewin, A. C., & Stier, H. (2018). Marital status, gender, and material hardship: Evidence from
Israel. Advances in Life Course Research, 35, 46–56.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.alcr.2018.01.002
McKernan, S., Ratcliffe, C., & Vinopal, K. (2009). Do Assets Help Families Cope with Adverse
Events?

McKernan, S.-M., Ratcliffe, C., & Vinopal, K. (2009). Do Assets Help Families Cope with
Adverse Events? In Washington, DC: Urban Institute.
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/33001/411994-Do-Assets-HelpFamilies-Cope-with-Adverse-Events-.PDF
Ministry of Finance (2020). Analysis of the Characteristics of Job Seekers during the
Coronavirus Period - May 2020. (In Hebrew). Retrieved from:
https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/dynamiccollectorresultitem/periodic-review07072020/he/weekly_economic_review_periodic-review-07072020.pdf.
Moynihan, D., & Herd, P. (2010). Red Tape and Democracy: How Rules Affect Citizenship
Rights. The American Review of Public Administration, 40(6), 654–670.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074010366732
National Insurance Institute of Israel. (2017). Poverty and Social Gaps in 2016, Annual Report.
National Insurance Institute of Israel.
National Insurance Institute of Israel. (2018). Annual Survey – 2018. (In Hebrew). Retrieved
from:
https://www.btl.gov.il/English%20Homepage/Publications/AnnualSurvey/2016/Docume
nts/Chapter%203_Unemployment.pdf.
National Insurance Institute of Israel. (2020). Statistical quarterly: Unemployment–Table 15.2.
Retrieved from:
https://www.btl.gov.il/SiteCollectionDocuments/btl/Publications/Rivon%20Statisti/PDF/
heb_rivon_3_1502.pdf.

National Insurance Institute. (2021). Benefit Amount. Retrieved from:
https://www.btl.gov.il/English%20Homepage/Benefits/Unemployment%20Insurance/Pag
es/BenefitAmount.aspx.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2021a). Poverty Rate. Retrieved
from: https://data.oecd.org/inequality/poverty-rate.htm.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2021b). Income Inequality.
Retrieved from: https://data.oecd.org/inequality/poverty-rate.htm.
Ratcliffe, C., McKernan, S.-M., & Zhang, S. (2011). How much does the supplemental nutrition
assistance program reduce food insecurity? American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
93(4), 1082–1098. https://doi.org/10.1093/ajae/aar026
Rector, R. E., Johnson, K. A., & Youssef, S. E. (1999). The extent of material hardship and
poverty in the United States. Review of Social Economy, 57(3), 351–387.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00346769900000007
Roll, S., & Grinstein-Weiss, M. (2020). Did CARES Act benefits reach vulnerable Americans?
Evidence from a national survey. https://www.brookings.edu/research/did-cares-actbenefits-reach-vulnerable-americans-evidence-from-a-national-survey/
Rose-Jacobs, R., Black, M. M., Casey, P. H., Cook, J. T., Cutts, D. B., Chilton, M., Heeren, T.,
Levenson, S. M., Meyers, A. F., & Frank, D. A. (2008). Household food insecurity:
Associations with at-risk infant and toddler development. Pediatrics, 121(1), 65–72.
https://doi.org/10.1542/peds.2006-3717
Rosenhek, Z. (2004). Globalization, Domestic Politics and the Restructuring of the Welfare
State: The Unemployment Insurance Program in Israel. In The Welfare State,

Globalization, and International Law (pp. 79–101). Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17008-9_4
Roser, M., Ritchie, H., Ortiz-Ospina, E., & Hasell, J. (2021). Coronavirus Pandemic (COVID19). Published Online at OurWorldInData.Org.
Sullivan, J. X., Turner, L., & Danziger, S. (2008). The relationship between income and material
hardship. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 27(1), 63–81.
https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.20307
The Pew Charitable Trusts. (2015). The Role of Emergency Savings in Family Financial
Security: How do Families Cope with Financial Shocks?
Urban Institute. (2018). Well-Being and Basic Needs Survey.
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/wellbeing_and_basic_needs_survey_2018_questionnaire.pdf

TABLES
Table 1. Sample Characteristics (Wave 1)
Characteristic
Age (years)
Male (%)
Religion/Ethnicity (%)
Jew (excluding Ultra-Orthodox)
Ultra-Orthodox Jew
Arab Israeli
Other
Married or lives with partner (%)
Any children in household (%)
Number of adults in household (%)
1
2
3+
Educational attainment (%)
High school degree or less
Post-secondary or Bachelor's degree
Master's degree or higher
Housing arrangement (%)
Own home
Pay rent
Neither own home nor pay rent
Employment before COVID-19 (%)
Full-time
Part-time
Unemployed/furloughed
Other
Average household gross monthly income before COVID-19 (%)
Low-income (NIS 0–8,000)
Middle-income (NIS 8,001–17,000)
High-income (NIS 17,001+)
Government benefit receipt (%)
Income support or supplement (past 3 mo)
One-time COVID-19 relief payment
Unemployment benefits (past 3 mo)
Material hardship (past 3 mo) (%)
Skipped a mortgage or rent payment
Skipped a bill or late bill
Reported food insecurity

Sample
Mean
43.0
43.7

Adult
Populationa

74.0
7.9
15.5
2.6
67.1
47.4

67.5 (2018)
8.2 (2018)
18.9 (2018)
5.4 (2018)

13.3
52.3
34.4
31.2
52.1
16.7
62.3
25.2
12.5
50.5
17.2
13.4
19.3
23.9
44.3
31.8
8.7
49.4
34.6
10.1
18.0
22.5

Observations

1,889

Notes: Exchange rates correspond to June 1, 2020 (USD 1 = NIS 3.51). Source: Authors’ calculations based on data
from CBS.
a

Table 2: Demographic and Financial Predictors of Material Hardship, Logistic Regression

Financial characteristics
HH gross monthly income, pre-COVID19 (ref.= NIS 0-8,000)
NIS 8,001-17,000
NIS 17,001+
Housing status (ref.=Owns without a
mortgage)
Owns with a mortgage
Rents
Neither owns nor rents
Government benefits
Unemployment benefits (past 3 mo)
Income support or supplement (past 3
mo)
One-time COVID-19 payment (NIS
1,000)
Demographic characteristics
Male (ref.=Female)
Age
Age squared
Religion/ethnicity (ref.=Jew, excluding
Ultra-Orthodox)
Ultra-Orthodox Jew
Arab Israeli
Married or living with a partner
(ref.=Single)
Highest educational attainment
(ref.=High school degree or less)
Post-secondary or Bachelor’s degree
Master’s degree or higher

Housing
hardship
(1)

Wave 1
Bill paying
hardship
(2)

Food
insecurity
(3)

Housing
hardship
(4)

Waves 2 and 3
Bill paying
hardship
(5)

Food
insecurity
(6)

-0.043*
(0.019)
0.080***
(0.020)

-0.063**
(0.024)

-0.076**
(0.027)

-0.049***
(0.013)

0.001
(0.016)

-0.079***
(0.019)

-0.141***
(0.026)

-0.186***
(0.028)

-0.072***
(0.014)

-0.088***
(0.017)

-0.174***
(0.021)

0.080***
(0.018)
0.119***
(0.019)
-0.017
(0.013)

0.083***
(0.021)
0.179***
(0.025)
-0.013
(0.022)

0.095***
(0.024)
0.174***
(0.027)
0.032
(0.030)

0.069***
(0.012)
0.078***
(0.013)
0.003
(0.010)

0.083***
(0.015)
0.166***
(0.019)
0.061**
(0.019)

0.104***
(0.018)
0.137***
(0.020)
0.076**
(0.024)

0.028*
(0.013)

0.029
(0.017)

0.045*
(0.019)

0.027**
(0.009)

0.043**
(0.013)

0.042**
(0.015)

0.078***
(0.018)

0.073**
(0.024)

0.127***
(0.028)

0.053***
(0.012)

0.059**
(0.019)

0.105***
(0.021)

-0.011
(0.007)

0.013*
(0.005)

0.002
(0.007)

-0.000
(0.003)

-0.003
(0.005)

-0.004
(0.006)

-0.018
(0.014)
-0.001
(0.003)
0.000
(0.000)

-0.046**
(0.017)
0.010*
(0.004)
-0.000*
(0.000)

-0.078***
(0.019)
0.008*
(0.004)
-0.000
(0.000)

0.003
(0.009)
0.002
(0.002)
-0.000
(0.000)

-0.015
(0.013)
0.009**
(0.003)
-0.000*
(0.000)

-0.025
(0.015)
0.015***
(0.003)
-0.000***
(0.000)

0.011
(0.021)
0.098***
(0.025)

0.011
(0.026)
0.208***
(0.031)

0.005
(0.031)
0.167***
(0.033)

-0.005
(0.012)
0.079***
(0.017)

0.021
(0.021)
0.246***
(0.025)

0.026
(0.026)
0.113***
(0.025)

-0.009
(0.019)

0.008
(0.024)

-0.023
(0.026)

-0.016
(0.013)

-0.042*
(0.019)

-0.031
(0.020)

-0.040*
(0.016)
0.067***

-0.066***
(0.019)

-0.058**
(0.021)

-0.021*
(0.011)

-0.055***
(0.015)

-0.032*
(0.016)

-0.095***

-0.095**

-0.031*

-0.094***

-0.058*

Number of children in HH (ref.=None)
1 child
2 children
3 or more children
Current employment (ref.=Full-time)
Part-time

(0.020)

(0.026)

(0.029)

(0.015)

(0.020)

(0.023)

0.014
(0.018)
0.034
(0.020)
0.096***
(0.027)

0.039
(0.023)
0.067**
(0.025)
0.118***
(0.030)

0.043
(0.027)
0.047
(0.028)
0.130***
(0.034)

0.013
(0.012)
0.020
(0.014)
0.030*
(0.014)

0.052**
(0.018)
0.044*
(0.019)
0.064**
(0.022)

0.024
(0.020)
0.014
(0.023)
0.034
(0.025)

0.014
(0.018)
0.065**
(0.022)
0.004
(0.020)

0.017
(0.023)
0.047
(0.025)
-0.026
(0.025)

-0.009
(0.025)
0.059*
(0.029)
-0.024
(0.028)

-0.001
0.026
(0.012)
(0.018)
Unemployed or furloughed
0.003
0.038*
(0.012)
(0.018)
Other
-0.011
-0.005
(0.014)
(0.019)
Wave 3
-0.007
-0.034***
(0.007)
(0.009)
Pseudo R-squared
0.2059
0.2113
0.1490
0.1517
0.1816
Observations
1,889
1,889
1,889
3,835
3,835
Notes: Coefficients correspond to average marginal effects of each independent variable obtained from a logistic
regression model. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
Each regression controls for the district of residence, the number of adults in a household, and “Other”
religion/ethnicity.

0.029
(0.020)
0.063**
(0.021)
0.037
(0.023)
-0.042***
(0.010)
0.1153
3,835

Table 3: Predicted Probabilities of Household Hardship, by Income and Unemployment Benefits
(Wave 1)

Housing hardship
Bill paying hardship
Food insecurity
(1)
(2)
(3)
Predictive
Predictive
Predictive
St. Err.
St. Err.
St. Err.
Margin
Margin
Margin
NIS 0-8,000
No
0.132
0.019
0.271
0.026
0.333
0.028
NIS 0-8,000
Yes
0.150
0.024
0.217
0.028
0.284
0.034
NIS 8,001-17,000
No
0.075
0.011
0.149
0.015
0.197
0.017
NIS 8,001-17,000
Yes
0.129**
0.017
0.238***
0.021
0.304***
0.025
NIS 17,001+
No
0.062
0.015
0.105
0.017
0.116
0.018
NIS 17,001+
Yes
0.057
0.016
0.110
0.021
0.145
0.025
Observations
1,889
1,889
1,889
Notes: Table reports predicted probabilities for each type of household hardship based on logistic regression models.
Comparison of predicted probabilities between households who received unemployment benefits within three
months of the survey and households who did not receive unemployment benefits (by household income). Statistical
significance: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05..
HH gross monthly
income, pre-COVID-19

Unemployment
benefits (past 3 mo)

Table 4: Predicted Probabilities of Household Hardship, by Income and Unemployment Benefits
(Waves 2 and 3)

Housing hardship
Bill paying hardship
Food insecurity
(1)
(2)
(3)
Predictive
Predictive
Predictive
St. Err.
St. Err.
St. Err.
Margin
Margin
Margin
NIS 0-8,000
No
0.108
0.014
0.172
0.016
0.268
0.020
NIS 0-8,000
Yes
0.124
0.019
0.197
0.023
0.315
0.028
NIS 8,001-17,000
No
0.046
0.007
0.159
0.011
0.190
0.013
NIS 8,001-17,000
Yes
0.094***
0.013
0.223**
0.017
0.233
0.019
NIS 17,001+
No
0.038
0.008
0.080
0.011
0.095
0.012
NIS 17,001+
Yes
0.047
0.012
0.113
0.018
0.138
0.019
Notes: Table reports predicted probabilities for each type of household hardship based on logistic regression models.
Comparison of predicted probabilities between households who received unemployment benefits within three
months of the survey and households who did not receive unemployment benefits (by household income). Statistical
significance: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05..
HH gross monthly
income, pre-COVID-19

Unemployment
benefits (past 3 mo)
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Figure 2: Receipt of Unemployment Benefits, by Wave
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Figure 3: Experience of Material Hardship, by Wave
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Figure 4: Predicted Probabilities of Housing Hardship, by Income and Unemployment Benefits
(Wave 1)
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Figure 5: Predicted Probabilities of Bill Paying Hardship, by Income and Unemployment
Benefits (Wave 1)
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Figure 6: Predicted Probabilities of Food Insecurity, by Income and Unemployment Benefits
(Wave 1)
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Figure 7: Predicted Probabilities of Housing Hardship, by Income and Unemployment Benefits
(Waves 2 and 3)

Predicted probability of hardship

.2

.15

.1

.05

0
NIS 0-8,000

NIS 8,001-17,000
Average Household Monthly Income
Did not receive unemp. benefits

Notes: Vertical lines correspond to 95% confidence intervals.

NIS 17,001+

Received unemp. benefits

Figure 8: Predicted Probabilities of Bill Paying Hardship, by Income and Unemployment
Benefits (Waves 2 and 3)
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Figure 9: Predicted Probabilities of Food Insecurity, by Income and Unemployment Benefits
(Waves 2 and 3)
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